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successful campaign to organize printing industry workers in the 
U.S. used innovative strategies that may be useful and instructive 
for Canadian unions. The campaign was initiated in 2002 by the 
Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU)1 at Quebecor World, a 
Canadian company, and one of the world’s largest commercial printing 
companies. Quebecor, which began as a small Quebec-based newspaper 
publisher, operates 150 commercial printing facilities in 16 counties and has 
revenues of over $6 billion. 
The Graphic Communications International Union has since merged with 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) in the United States and the 
Communications Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) in Canada. 
At the time of the campaign, GCIU had approximately 80,000 members in the US 
and Canada, almost all of them in the printing, publishing or packaging 
industries. 
GCIU used a comprehensive campaign strategy of rank and file 
organizing, membership mobilization, corporate leverage and global solidarity to 
win a neutrality and fair election process agreement with Quebecor World and 
brought union representation to hundreds of printing industry workers.   
 
BACKGROUND – THE U.S. LABOUR MOVEMENT 
 
Since the 1970’s U.S. unions have suffered a precipitous decline in 
membership. The reasons for this decline have been extensively debated, 
dissected and documented elsewhere (Chaison and Rose 1991; Riddell and 
Riddell 2001). While political and economic factors, such as weak labour laws, 
globalization, the decline of manufacturing. the rise of a contingent workforce 
and the increasing anti-union behaviour of  U.S. corporations  have played a 
major part in the decline, many observers, including many union activists began, 
in the late 1980’s, to argue that unions themselves  have been responsible, at least 
partially, for the decline in union density.  
A
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Most U.S. unions had become merely service organizations – business 
unions - by the 1960’s, content with bargaining wages and benefits for their 
existing members. As union density fell, so did union bargaining power and 
unions found themselves spending increasing amounts of their time and 
resources desperately trying to defend their dwindling membership from 
increasingly belligerent employers intent on extracting massive concessions.  
Organizing new workers became increasingly difficult, with workers 
subject to threats, harassment, discipline, discrimination and dismissal as 
employers in the U.S. were able to act with almost complete impunity under the 
weak enforcement provisions of the National Labor Relations Board.  The pre-
eminent human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, has even suggested 
that the long delays and weak enforcement of violations by the NLRB has led to 
a situation in the United States where organizing rights for workers have been 
severely curtailed.  
A number of U.S. union leaders began to realize that if U.S. labour were 
to survive they would have to devote far greater resources to organizing and 
learn how to organize in this increasingly hostile climate. 
The election of John Sweeney as president of the AFL-CIO (the first 
competitive election at the AFL-CIO in 30 years) heralded a new emphasis on 
organizing. Richard Bensinger, the founder of the AFL-CIO’s Organizing 
Institute, which trained thousands of young workers and students as organizers, 
argued that unions needed to spend at least 30 percent of their budgets on 
organizing. The pioneering work of Kate Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, 
which detailed the tactics used in successful organizing campaigns, showed that 
workers could be organized in the U.S. only if unions used new and creative 
“rank and file intensive”  tactics.2   
 
THE CANADIAN SITUATION 
 
Unlike the U.S. movement, the Canadian labour movement has grown 
since the 1980’s (Jackson and Schetagne 2003). Canadian unions, however, 
should not be complacent. Union density has also been on the decline in Canada 
- from a high of over 40 percent in 1984 to 30 percent today (Jackson and 
Schetagne 2003; Statistics Canada 2005).  While labour laws, and their 
enforcement, have been stronger in Canada, they have become weaker in the last 
decade with many provinces now requiring a vote rather than granting 
automatic certification based on a card majority. Employers in Canada, while still 
under greater legal constraints than U.S. employers, have become increasingly 
aggressive, borrowing many tactics from the U.S., such as hiring union busting 
consultants and lawyers and violating the law when they determine the penalties 
are worth the risk to remain “union free”(Bentham 1999; Yates 2000). 
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THE GCIU CAMPAIGN 
 
The GCIU, like many other U.S.-based unions had witnessed a profound 
membership loss, almost 50 percent since the 1980’s.  In 2000, a new leadership 
was elected with a mandate to revitalize and rebuild the union. Under the 
leadership of newly elected Canadian Vice President, Duncan Brown and newly 
appointed Organizing Director Bert Haft, both long time GCIU organizers, a new 
organizing program was developed. 
Brown and Haft presented a strategic plan for organizing to the GCIU 
Convention in 2000 and the union raised its per capita and earmarked a 
substantial increase in funds for organizing. The union moved away from its old 
model of organizing based on plant gate leafleting and mass meetings to a model 
based on using rank and file organizers, house-calling, and building active and 
representative inside committees. Former AFL-CIO Director of Organizing 
Richard Bensinger was hired as a consultant and developed a GCIU Organizing 
Institute (OI) which trained hundreds of GCIU members as rank and file 
organizers. An intern program took the best of the OI graduates and gave them 
six months training in the field.  
The new organizing program met with some success. The GCIU was able 
to move campaigns faster and in almost all campaigns, signed up a majority of 
workers. Unfortunately, the union was still losing a majority of elections. 
Particularly disappointing was a loss in 2001 at a 650-worker Quebecor World 
plant in Corinth, Mississippi. It was the GCIU’s fourth attempt at organizing this 
plant. A team of newly trained rank and file organizers signed 60 percent of the 
plant within three weeks but, after a virulent anti-union campaign by the 
company, the union lost the election by a two to one margin. 
Focus groups conducted after the election pointed to two main reasons 
why workers had voted against the union. First, while workers liked the house-
callers, they did not like the inside committee, who they felt were cliquish and 
hotheaded. GCIU had relied on activists from previous campaigns to form the 
inside committee and had failed to recruit new committee members or provide 
adequate training to the committee. Second, the company had threatened that 
the plant might close if workers voted for the union. This scared people into 
voting against the union. 
 The GCIU was still convinced that they were on the right track. More 
effort would need to be put into recruiting and training committee members and 
a plan for countering the anti-union campaigns needed to be developed. A new 
Research Director, Alan Tate, who had been an International Representative for 
the union in Canada for 15 years, was hired, with a mandate to build the union’s 
capacity for strategic research and corporate campaigns. 
 Early in 2002, the GCIU, convinced that the new organizing program 
could be successful with some additional resources, met with the AFL- CIO to 
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request an organizing grant. This led to a series of meetings with AFL-CIO staff 
to develop a project that would move GCIU’s organizing program to a new level.  
Working closely with the AFL-CIO’s Center for Strategic Research, GCIU 
put together an ambitious plan to organize Quebecor World, the world’s largest 
commercial printer and the largest employer of GCIU members in both the 
United States and Canada. GCIU wanted to take on a large-scale campaign that 
would transform its relationship with the company by increasing the union’s 
density and bargaining power. 
 For almost six months a small group of research and organizing staff 
from the AFL-CIO and the GCIU put together a plan that would be both 
ambitious and achievable. A key architect of this plan was Davis Chu, the 
Director of the AFL-CIO’s Center for Strategic Research, an experienced 
corporate campaigner who had come from the Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) with Sweeney.  
The experience at Corinth convinced the GCIU and the AFL-CIO that 
they must get the company to “back off” from its anti-union stance, particularly 
the constant threats of plant closure. A major component of the campaign would, 
therefore, need to be a leverage (or corporate) campaign to convince Quebecor 
World to allow workers to join the union without company interference. A 
decision was made to not subject workers to the long delays and weak remedies 
of a National Labour Relations Board election but instead demand a fair process, 
preferably a simple card check, from the company. 
In addition, the union decided to mobilize its existing Quebecor members to 
support the organizing campaigns. GCIU had about 8000 members who worked 
for Quebecor in the U.S. and Canada. At a meeting of the union’s Quebecor 
Bargaining Council in 2002, delegates agreed that the number one priority, in 
terms of increasing their bargaining strength, was to organize more plants and 
build more density in the company.  
So, a campaign was developed with three major components: organizing, 
leverage and membership mobilization.  
 
INNOVATIVE ORGANIZING TACTICS 
 
The organizing strategy was to target ten plants in the two major 
divisions of the company. Success at these plants, it was estimated, would give 
GCIU an 80 percent density in the two most important and profitable divisions 
of the company. As it happened, most of the unorganized plants in these 
divisions were located in the mid-South region of the U.S. – Tennessee, Northern 
Mississippi and Kentucky – so the union was able to concentrate its organizing 
efforts geographically. In addition, there were a number of GCIU Quebecor 
plants within close proximity, which would allow the campaign to bring together 
organized and unorganized workers. After six-weeks of making contact with key 
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leaders in the targeted plants and assessing the level of support, the union 
decided to focus on seven plants where it felt viable campaigns were possible, 
two on the U.S. West Coast and five in the Mid-South Region. 
Since this was a campaign that would not rely on a National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) election, GCIU had to use innovative organizing tactics 
to build strong committees and sustain the campaign while the union focused on 
getting the company to the table to negotiate a fair process for organizing. 
The campaign went public when workers from the organizing 
committees in the targeted plants simultaneously “marched on the boss”, 
demanding from their local management the right to organize free from 
intimidation and harassment. 
While no cards were signed during this phase of the campaigns, the 
inside committees circulated a number of surveys and petitions focused on 
specific issues such as health care costs and health and safety issues. Workers 
held parking lot rallies, t-shirt days and other mass actions to keep up constant 
activity at the plants.  
 GCIU had between three and five organizers at each of the seven target 
plants, most of them inexperienced interns and graduates of the GCIU’s 
Organizing Institute. Organizers worked ten day rotations with four days off and 
were expected to work ten to twelve hour days. GCIU’s Organizing Director, 
Bert Haft, and an experienced lead organizer from the AFL-CIO, Jennifer Hill, 
coordinated the campaigns. Dozens of GCIU members participated as house-
callers throughout this period. 
 
THE LEVERAGE STRATEGY 
 
The leverage strategy was designed to pressure the company to negotiate 
a neutrality agreement.  Major Quebecor customers were targeted and asked to 
support the right of Quebecor workers to organize.  Quebecor printed catalogues 
and flyers for a number of major retailers. The union leafleted many of these 
retailers, urging them tell Quebecor that they must respect workers rights to 
organize if they wanted to continue to do business with them. Many did, 
including IKEA and Victoria’s Secret, where the union had conducted large scale 
leafleting directed at customers inside the stores. Hundreds of GCIU members 
from dozens of locals in the U.S. and Canada were involved in these and other 
“street actions”. Trade shows, where Quebecor World was a sponsor or 
presenter, were leafleted and disrupted by GCIU activists.  GCIU members and 
workers from the unorganized plants attended Quebecor World shareholders 
meetings. They forced the Chairman of the Board, former Canadian Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney, to spend much of the meeting dealing with workers 
rights. U.S. Presidential candidate John Kerry publicly supported the campaign, 
as did dozens of religious leaders and leading authors including Canadian 
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authors Margaret Atwood, Judy Rebick and Linda McQuaig. A state senator and 
a religious leader from Kentucky went to Montreal to meet with company 
executives to tell them what they had heard from workers at the Versailles plant 
in Kentucky and to urge the company to negotiate a neutrality agreement with 
the GCIU. 
 
MOBILIZING THE MEMBERSHIP 
 
Mobilizing began by assessing the ability and willingness of existing 
GCIU Quebecor locals to engage in escalating activity in support of the 
organizing and leverage campaigns. “Solidarity committees” were organized in 
each plant. Organizing Director Bert Haft remarked, “It makes no sense to ask 
the most vulnerable workers – those in the unrepresented plants, to bear the 
brunt of this campaign. Our members, who are protected by a union contract, 
have to be on the front lines”. 
This was, perhaps, the most difficult organizing task since the GCIU did 
not have a culture of this type of mobilization. GCIU assigned organizers to work 
on membership mobilization and, in the end, the union managed to move many 
of these locals to action.  Ultimately, hundreds of GCIU activists became engaged 
in some form or another in the campaign. Many GCIU Quebecor workers who 
came out as member organizers on the campaign were excited and energized by 
the experience. They went back into their plants to build the solidarity committee 
and urge support for the workers trying to form unions. The solidarity 
committees got petitions signed and presented them to their local managements, 
demanding that Quebecor World respect workers rights. Locals who were in 
bargaining with Quebecor World in Toronto and Halifax brought workers from 
the unorganized plants in Tennessee and Mississippi to the bargaining table and 
forced the company to discuss organizing rights during bargaining. GCIU plants 
held solidarity days; members wore t-shirts or stickers demanding “Justice @ 
Quebecor”. 
  
THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN 
 
A fourth component of the campaign also developed as the union took 
the campaign global and engaged unions that dealt with Quebecor World in 
Europe and Latin America.  GCIU had a relationship with these unions through 
Union Network International (UNI). In 2001, UNI had established a Quebecor 
Working Group whose mandate was to campaign for a global labour standards 
agreement. The GCIU’s Duncan Brown, fortuitously, chaired this working group. 
 In December 2003, a Global Quebecor Solidarity Conference in Memphis, 
Tennessee brought together these two campaigns – the campaign for organizing 
rights in the U.S. and the global campaign for a labour standards agreement. 
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Over 120 delegates from 14 countries, including Quebecor workers from 
France, Spain, Brazil, the UK, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Canada, Belgium, Mexico 
and the United States attended this historic conference. Delegates discussed the 
problems they faced in their Quebecor World plants and heard from the workers 
in Tennessee, Nevada and Mississippi who were attempting to organize. A 
strategy was developed to put pressure on the company worldwide and the 
Justice @ Quebecor campaign was officially launched. 
In addition to attending the conference, delegates spent two days visiting 
workers at their homes in Tennessee and Mississippi and attempted to meet with 
management at their plants. On the final day, a large rally was held in Memphis 
commemorating International Human Rights Day with the theme: Workers 
Rights are Human Rights! 
The conference was followed by a series of “global solidarity days” where 
workers from Quebecor plants all over the world wore “Justice @ Quebecor” 
stickers, signed petitions supporting global labour rights and, in some cases, 
staged rallies at their own plants. 
Global unions also played a role in pressuring Quebecor’s customers. The 
Swedish printing union put pressure on Ikea, a Swedish furniture retailer and 
major customer of Quebecor World. The Spanish union urged Telefonica, the 
Spanish telephone company and another major customer, to insist that Quebecor 
World respect workers rights to organize. 
Finally, after almost two years, Quebecor responded. A series of meetings 
between company officials and GCIU and AFL-CIO officials began. At the same 
time the company also agreed to meet with a committee from UNI to discuss a 
global labour rights agreement.  
In May 2005, the company signed an agreement with the Graphic 
Communications Conference of the Teamsters (GCC/IBT) - by this time the 
GCIU had merged with the Teamsters in the U.S. - stipulating that it would 
remain neutral and not interfere or oppose its employees’ efforts to unionize. The 
24-page memorandum of Agreement contained the following language: 
 
The Employer shall make no statement or action showing opposition to 
unionization. The Employer shall make no disparaging remarks about the 
Union or its representative. The Employer will not state or advocate that 
its employees should not support a union to represent them. Any Union 
employees of the employer shall not be characterized as a “third party” or 
an “outsider”. 
 
The agreement also provided for an election process run by a mutually agreed 
upon arbitrator rather than the NLRB. 
Within months of signing the agreement the GCC/IBT organized over 
200 workers at a Quebecor plant in Fernley, Nevada and a month later almost 
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250 workers in the Quebecor plant in Versailles, Kentucky also voted to join the 
GCC/IBT.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Unions in Canada are not faced with the same crisis that faces unions in 
the U.S. or the same intensity of employer hostility.  Nevertheless, union density 
has declined in Canada and is likely to decline further unless Canadian unions 
devote more energy and resources to organizing. New strategies and tactics will 
be necessary to counter the increasing employer offensive and to make sure the 
Canadian labour movement continues to grow.  It is clear that union strategies 
have a significant impact on organizing success (Bronfenbrenner 1999; Nissen 
1999; Fantasia & Ross 2004; Yates 2000). 
 While all campaigns are different and different campaigns require 
different strategies, many of the strategies used in the Quebecor World campaign 
may prove useful for Canadian unions looking to increase density and 
bargaining power. These strategies include: 
 
 Strategic Targeting: Targets plants were chosen for their strategic 
importance not because they were “hot shops”. In fact, although GCIU 
had held campaigns at many of these plants in the past, the experience 
was that support for the union was not necessarily stronger in plants 
where workers had approached the union than in plants where there had 
been no previous contact.  
 Rank & File Organizers: Almost all the organizers used in the campaign 
were rank and file GCIU members, recruited through the Organizing 
Institute training program. While the GCIU would have preferred to have 
had more experienced lead organizers to coordinate the campaigns, a 
conscious decision was made not to use the GCIU’s “professional” 
organizing staff, all of whom had been schooled in old methods.  
 Building Large and Representative Committees: In the targeted plants 
between 8 percent and 15 percent of the workers in the plant were active 
on the committee.  Committee members were vocal and public in their 
support for the union. Extensive and ongoing education was done with 
the committees. In particular, much time was spent educating and 
“inoculating” members about the company’s anti-union tactics. 
 Extensive Housecalling: One-on-one communication was the major 
method used reach workers. No literature was handed out except by the 
inside committees themselves in the plants. More than 70 percent of the 
plant was house-called at least once. 
 Mobilizing the Membership: A strategic decision was made to mobilize 
the GCIU Quebecor World membership in support of the organizing 
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campaigns. Extensive education was done with local leadership on the 
relationship between their bargaining power and organizing so they 
understood that supporting the organizing campaigns was in their own 
interest. The fact that so many rank and file GCIU members were 
involved in and energized by the campaign also sustained the campaign 
politically in the union and began to create an activist culture within the 
union. 
 Using Leverage: Going on the offensive against the company and talking 
directly to customers, shareholders and community leaders forced the 
company to agree to neutrality and a fair election process.  
 Going Global: The global campaign allowed GCIU to use the influence of 
the European and Latin American unions to pressure the company. By 
integrating the UNI campaign for global labour standards with the GCIU 
campaign for organizing rights, the global campaign became more than a 
solidarity campaign but a true global campaign. 
 
POST SCRIPT 
 
In October 2005, the GCC/IBT failed to win a majority in the Quebecor 
plant in Covington, Tennessee. The union claims that the company violated the 
neutrality agreement by sending anti-union letters to worker’s homes and 
holding one-on-one and captive audience meetings with workers. The union has 
filed 49 complaints with the arbitrator and is also filing a civil law suit alleging a 
breach of contract by the company. 
At the same time, while the company agreed to language for a global 
labour rights protocol with UNI in September 2005, it has since refused to sign 
the agreement. UNI has written a letter to Pierre Karl Peladeau, the CEO of 
Quebecor World demanding that the company sign the agreed to language.  
 
The struggle continues. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1  In 2005 the GCIU merged with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in the United States. Most 
Canadian GCIU locals rejected the merger with the Teamsters and instead elected to merge with the 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) 
2  The recent split between the AFL-CIO and the “Change to Win Coalition” was essentially the result 
of the ongoing debate over how to rebuild the U.S. labour movement. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bentham, K. 1999. “Employer Resistance to Union Certification” Relations 
Industrielles/Industrial Relations, Vol. 57 #1 150-185 
Tate   49 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Bronfenbrenner, K and T. Juravich. 1998. “It Takes More Than House Calls To 
Win With A Comprehensive Union-Buiding Strategy” Organizing to Win. 
K. Bronfenbrenner et al., eds Ithaca and London: IRL Press 
Chaison, G and J. Rose. 1991.  ‘The Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and 
Decline” The State of the Unions George Strauss et al., eds  1991 Madison: 
Industrial Relations Research Association 
Statistics Canada 2005.  “Fact Sheet on Unionization”. Perspectives on Labour and 
Income August 2005.  
Fantasia, R. and K. Ross 2004. Hard Work – Remaking the American Labor Movement 
Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 
Jackson, A and S. Shetagne 2003. “Solidarity Forever – An Analysis of Changes in 
Union Density” 2003 Canadian Labour Congress Research Paper #25 
NISSEN, Bruce, 1999 Which Direction for Organized Labor? Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press 
Riddell, C and W.C Riddell. 2001 “Changing Patterns of Unionization: the North 
American Experience, 1984-1998”. University of British Columbia 
Department of Economics Working Paper 2001 
Yates, C. 2000 “Staying the Decline in Union Membership Organizing in Ontario, 
1985-1999” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, Vol. 55, #4 640-675 
 
 
